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Over the last decade, sports journalists, college coaches, athletic di-
rectors, and NCAA 1 officials have expressed the notion that the sports
industry is plagued by "unethical" agents. This "problem" has spawned
a steady stream of legislation and regulation specifically designed to
clean up the industry.3 The author continues to question, however,
whether this regulatory approach makes any sense.4 In fact, it is time to
consider a whole new approach: deregulation. Just as some have sug-
gested decriminalization as a legitimate approach to the drug problem,
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.
1. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a voluntary association
whose membership includes virtually all major colleges and universities. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183-184 (1988).
2. See Linda S. Calvert, The Florida Legislature Revisits the Regulation and Liability of
Sports Agents and Student Athletes, 25 STETSON L. REv. 1067 (1996).
3. Agent regulation is a growth industry. Both the number of states regulating agents and
the extent of the regulations keeps increasing. States regulating the athlete representation
industry include: Alabama: ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-1 to 8-26-40 (1995); Arkansas: ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 17-48-101 to 17-48-203 (Michie 1995); California: CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE
§§ 6106.7, 18897.27, 18897.8 and 18897.9 (West Supp. 1996) CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500 to 1550
(West Supp. 1996); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 468.451 to 468.457 (West Supp. 1995); Geor-
gia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-4A-1 to 43-4A-19 (1995); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 29-1
(Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1990); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-46-4-1 to 35-46-4-4 (Burns
1995); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 9A.1 to 9A.12 (West Supp. 1995); Kentucky: Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 518.080 (Baldwin 1995); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:421 to 4:430
(West 1995); Maryland: MD. Bus. REG. CODE ANN. §§ 4-401 to 4-426 (1995); Michigan: MICH.
Comp. LAxvs ANN. § 750.411e (West 1991); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325E.33 to
325E.99 (West 1994); Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 73-41-1 to 73-41-23 (Supp. 1990); Ne-
vada: NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 398.015 to 398.065 (Michie 1993); North Carolina: N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 78C-71 to 78C-81 (1995); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 9-15-01 to 9-15-05
(1995); Ohio: OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4771.01 to 4771.99 (Anderson 1995); Oklahoma:
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.61-821.70 (West 1995); Pennsylvania: PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7107 (Purdon 1995); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-102-10 to 59-102-250 (LAw. Co-
op. 1993); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-7-2101 to 49-7-2109 (1995); Texas: TEX. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871,1-11 (West 1995) and TEx. REv. PENAL. CODE ANN. § 832.44 (West
1993); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-518 to 54.1-525 (Supp. 1990); Washington: WASH.
REv. CODE. §§ 18.175.010 to 18.175.080 (1995).
4. The author previously criticized this regulatory regime as being a wolf in sheep's cloth-
ing. While styled as legislation designed to protect athletes, it actually does little more than
protect schools and turn private NCAA regulation into public law. Jan Stiglitz, NCAA-Based
Regulation: Who Are We Protecting?, 67 N.D. L. REv. 215 (1991).
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the purpose of this essay is to suggest that deregulation is the best solu-
tion to some of the problems commonly associated with sports agents.
II. THE NATURE OF T=E PROBLEM
Before proceeding with the argument and analysis, it is essential to
carefully define the nature of the problem being discussed. With the ex-
ception of attorney solicitation, the author does not suggest deregulation
or decriminalization of the kind of conduct that is generally prohibited
outside the world of sports agentry. Defrauding clients or stealing their
money should be illegal and offenders should be punished. But this kind
of conduct is not what gets most of the attention. Rather, the problem
that is invariably being discussed when one reads or hears about unethi-
cal agents relates to actions by agents which lead to the loss of collegiate
eligibility for the athlete or NCAA sanctions for the athlete's institution.
This essay suggests that the solution is not to generate additional rules
and statutes to further punish athletes, institutions or agents, but to look
at the existing rules and statutes to see whether any real wrong has been
done.
III. THE ATHLETE-AGENT RELATIONSHIP
The starting point for analysis is the player-agent relationship be-
cause that relationship is the focal point for most complaints. These
complaints are usually the result of a violation of the NCAA's prohibi-
tion against an athlete entering into a contract with an agent. The
NCAA's rules on this point are quite clear:
12.3.1. GENERAL RULE. An individual shall be ineligible for par-
ticipation in an intercollegiate sport if he or she has ever agreed
(orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the pur-
pose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that
sport.
12.3.1.1. REPRESENTATION FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. An in-
dividual shall be ineligible per 12.3.1 if he or she enters into a
verbal or written agreement with an agent for representation in
future professional sports negotiations that are to take place after
the individual has completed his or her eligibility in that sport.5
Thus, the NCAA's rules prevent the athlete from entering into a con-
tractual relationship with an agent. An agent who induces a player into
5. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.3.1, 12.3.1.1, reprinted in 1996-1997 NCAA MANUAL 100-101
(1996).
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violating that rule is considered to be unethical. Does that make sense?
Or should that ethical rule be changed?
In answering that question, we should consider the answer to another
question: at what point should we expect and, therefore, allow a player
to consult with an agent and enter into a formal relationship? To answer
this we should put ourselves in the position of the athlete.
Assume that you are a college football player at Notre Dame and
that you have just finished your junior year. The National Football
League (NFL) is about to conduct its draft and you are trying to decide
whether to enter the draft and forgo your senior year. You know that
you can not test the waters and see how you do in the draft because the
NCAA will declare you to be ineligible if you make yourself eligible for
the draft.6 Who do you want to talk to about this decision? Who is in
the best position to give you advice on what is best for you?
Several possibilities come to mind. First, you can turn to your par-
ents. But are your parents likely to have concrete information about
your chances of getting selected in the draft, the round in which you are
likely to go, the team or teams which might draft you, the salary you
might expect, the chance of injury if you stay in school, or the quality of
people playing your positions who are in this year's draft as compared to
next year's?
Another person you might consult is your coach. But again, one
might ask what concrete information your coach would have. His or her
job is to study his or her own team and to scout high school players.
Your coach doesn't study the NFL. In addition, since we are assuming
that you are a good player, your coach has a vested interest in having
you stay at Notre Dame for as long as possible.
The NCAA does allow a school to create a "professional sports coun-
seling panel" to advise students about professional careers.7 This panel
may review a proposed professional contract,8 assist the student in the
selection of an agent,9 and even visit with agents and teams to help de-
termine an athlete's market value.10 But the NCAA rules expressly pro-
6. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.2.4.2, reprinted in 1996-1997 NCAA MANUAL 100 (1996). Un-
til recently, there was an exception for basketball. See NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.2.4.2.1., re-
printed in 1996-1997 NCAA MANUAL 100 (1996). That exception was just recently abolished.
Lisa Dillman, Eligibility Rule for NBA Draft Choices Revised, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1997, at C5.
7. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.3.4 (a), reprinted in 1996-1997 NCAA MANUAL 101 (1996).
8. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.3.4 (b), reprinted in 1996-1997 NCAA MANUAL 101 (1996).
9. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.3.4 (f), reprinted in 1996-1997 NCAA MANUAL 101 (1996).
10. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.3.4 (g), reprinted in 1996-1997 NCAA MANUAL 101 (1996).
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vide that panel members must be full time employees of the institution."
Although the rules limit the panel membership to only one member,
who is employed in the athletic department,12 this does not completely
eliminate bias. As long as the institution has a vested, financial interest
in encouraging the student to stay, full time employees of the institution
may not be wholly neutral.'3
What other persons, thus, have the expertise to analyze the draft and
determine whether it makes sense to stay at Notre Dame or go into the
draft? Agents. In reality, there are only two groups of people who study
the players' market: agents and people who work for NFL teams."' Be-
cause NFL teams also have interests that might be in direct opposition to
the best interests of the players, agents are probably the best sources of
information.
At this point, one could legitimately question whether there are in-
herent conflicts between the interests of players and agents. However, if
one looks at the big picture, then the answer is no. A player wants to
maximize his or her financial opportunities and freedom of choice.' 5 In
other words, a player wants to be rich and happy. Agents are also inter-
ested in maximizing a player's financial interests because agent compen-
sation is generally a percentage of an athlete's salary. To that extent,
players and agents inherently possess the same interests.
Furthermore, good agents are also united in interest with players
when it comes to freedom of choice. The happier a client is, the less
likely he or she will change agents and the more likely he or she will
recommend that friends sign with that agent.
Does that mean that there is never a conflict between the interests of
a player and an agent? Of course not. However, the issue is not
whether the agent is the only voice that should be heard. The real ques-
tion is whether it is in the athlete's best interest to have that voice avail-
11. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.3.4.2, reprinted in 1996-1997 NCAA MANUAL 101 (1996).
12. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.3.4.2, reprinted in 1996-1997 NCAA MANUAL 101 (1996).
13. That schools have a strong financial interest in successful athletic programs is well
documented. For example, some bowl games are now paying over eight million dollars to the
schools who are invited. See Jonathan Faigen, Green With Envy: Athletes Earn Schools Mil-
lions, But What's In It For Them, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 31, 1995, at Sports 1; Dan Cray, Col-
leges Score Windfall Selling Ads on Athletes, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 1994, at Al.
14. The author recognizes that sportswriters do this as well. But with the exception of,
perhaps, Fred Edelstein, or Mel Kiper, Jr., this is a minor part of their job and their livelihood
doesn't depend on how well they perform such a task. Few care whether the football writer
for the local paper was right in predicting which quarterbacks would go in the first round.
15. By that I mean the player wants it all. He wants to play college football, enjoy college
life, and get a degree without having to sacrifice any money.
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able. Moreover, the reality is that an athlete will not hear only one
agent's opinion. The top athletes will be getting solicited (and thus get-
ting advice) from a number of agents.
Skeptics of this analysis should consider an alternate hypothetical.
Suppose the NCAA had a rule which stated:
An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an intercolle-
giate sport if he or she has ever agreed (orally or in writing) to be
treated by a non-university physician for the purpose of determin-
ing his or her physical condition and whether he or she should
continue to play or instead should seek additional treatment.
People would agree that such a rule would be outrageous. But why is
such a rule different from the "no agent" rule?
As in the draft situation, an athlete with a medical problem may need
critical advice from an outside expert - neither the athlete nor his or
her parents would necessarily know what medical treatment is best.
Similarly, as in the draft situation, there is good reason for the athlete to
be wary of taking advice from any person affiliated with the team or
institution. This is because a team doctor may be judged on how quickly
he or she gets players back out on the field.
Would our sense of outrage be eliminated if the NCAA also allowed
the athlete to get assistance from a school sponsored medical panel, like
the professional sports counseling panel? Not if the rules still prohibited
the student from engaging the professional services of an independant
physician.
One might question whether the author has presented a fair analogy.
Medical services may be more critical than the services provided by an
agent. But, just as a college athlete might prefer to consult with the
Jobe/Kerlan clinic in Los Angeles for a question about whether surgery
is required on a knee, that same athlete might think that retaining an
agent with Leigh Steinberg's experience and expertise is equally
important.
Thus, when an agent signs a player who is still eligible and that player
loses his or her eligibility, who is the real villain? The agent who is filling
a legitimate need, or the NCAA that has imposed a rule which has no
inherent justification? If it's the latter, isn't deregulation more appropri-
ate than expanding a system of state regulation which takes private
NCAA rules and turns them into public law?
1997]
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IV. ACCEPTANCE OF MONEY IN EXCHANGE FOR ENTERING
A CONTRACT
Another frequently cited ethical problem is the agent who pays the
athlete for the privilege of representing that athlete. Again, this practice
is specifically proscribed by the NCAA's rules:
12.3.1.2 BENEFITS FROM PROSPECTIVE AGENTS. An individual
shall be ineligible per 12.3.1 if he or she (or his or her relatives or
friends) accepts transportation or other benefits from any person
who wishes to represent the individual in the marketing of his or
her athletics ability.' 6
Similar restrictions exist in professional sports representation. For
example, the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) prohibits
agents from:
(b) Providing or offering a monetary inducement (other than a
fee less than the maximum fee contained in the standard fee
agreement...) to any player (including rookies) or college ath-
lete to induce or encourage that person to utilize his services; 17
These are the rules which make it "unethical" for an agent to give a
player a suitcase full of money. But why do these rules exist? Why
should it be unethical?
At this point, the analysis needs to be divided into two separate ques-
tions. First, is there anything inherently wrong with paying a player for
the right to represent that player? This question cuts across sports and
deals with both the amateur and professional athlete. The second ques-
tion relates to the specific problem of payment to a supposedly non-pro-
fessional athlete. The answer to both questions are the same.
V. PAYING FOR THE RIGHT TO REPRESENT AN ATHLETE
As argued previously,18 if we have a student/inventor who wants to
market a product but doesn't have the capital to get that product to mar-
ket, it would not be unethical for an investor to give that inventor money
in order to develop and market the product. This is basic capitalism.
Even in the sports world, we seem to generally allow capitalism.
When NIKE decided that it could make money by marketing its prod-
16. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.3.1.2, reprinted in 1996-1997 NCAA MANUAL 101 (1996).
17. NBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents, sec. 3 [Standard of Conduct for Player
Agents in Providing Services Governed by These Regulations], subdivision B: Prohibited
Conduct Subject to Discipline (as amended June, 1991).
18. Stiglitz, supra note 4, at 223.
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ucts through Tiger Woods, it was not unethical for NIKE to offer Tiger
Woods millions of dollars for the right to use his name and likeness.
To the extent that an agent wants to "invest" in the future income of
a player, it can be to the mutual benefit of both the player and the agent
to allow such a relationship. Why should it be unethical?
One can't deny that such an arrangement could be quite helpful to an
athlete. Suppose, for example, a college football player is not happy
with the NFL team that has drafted him or with the amount of money
that he is being offered. The average recent graduate faced with this
problem would not have the financial resources to enable him to "hold
out" in an attempt to get a better offer or force a team to trade his draft
rights. If that athlete was allowed to obtain financial support from an
agent, the balance of power might shift.
Certainly, the teams would not like that possibility. To the extent
that the players associations have obtained benefits in collective bargain-
ing for giving these draft systems a labor antitrust shield, the associations
might have legitimate reasons to assist the teams in the preservation of
those systems. But that does not mean that an agent who wants to vio-
late this rule and helps his client challenge the restraints of the draft
system is inherently unethical.
One person familiar with the genesis of this rule indicated that the
NBPA, in drafting this rule, was concerned that the practice of paying for
representation was "unseemly." But, there is a big difference between
unseemly and unethical.
That same person indicated that the NBPA was also concerned that a
player entering the draft was "vulnerable" and that only the less estab-
lished agents would pay for the right to represent a player. However,
just because this is not something that a David Falk19 or a Leonard
Armato20 would do, does not mean that a person who was willing to do
it would provide inadequate representation.
Moreover, a market with a rule that allowed initial payments would
either give the more successful agents like Falk and O'Neal another com-
petitive edge or enable others to break into the business. If one believes
in the free enterprise system, increased competition among service prov-
iders (agents) should benefit the customers (athletes). Thus, once again,
deregulation is as appropriate a response as increased regulation.
19. David Falk is Michael Jordan's agent.
20. Leonard Armato is Shaquille O'Neal's agent.
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VI. PAYMENTS TO COLLEGE ATHLETES
When it comes to amateur athletics, there is an entirely different set
of considerations. To the extent that there is a legitimacy to maintaining
amateurism in college athletics, one could argue that payments to ath-
letes should be prohibited. But for many reasons, the notion of amateur-
ism in college athletics is a joke.21
First, college athletics is a billion-dollar industry. At best, it is only
amateur for the players. Second, college athletes are already being com-
pensated for their athletic ability. They get free tuition and room and
board. So, why do we draw the line at additional funds? Or, to para-
phrase an old punch line, we know what they are - we are just discuss-
ing the price.
In recent years, the question of additional compensation for college
athletes has been explored and a number of practical arguments have
been raised against it. For example, payment of money to a college ath-
lete might have tax consequences for the athlete and the institution,
might have expensive Title IX consequences, and might require workers'
compensation coverage. However, allowing the athletes to get payment
from sources outside the university would not raise any of those
problems. In fact, the NCAA has recently authorized student athletes to
work outside the school in order to earn extra money.22
Why restrict an athlete's ability to make extra money? If anything,
the NCAA's position makes it even more difficult for the student-athlete
to benefit from his or her educational experience. A student-athlete's
extensive practice, game and travel schedule puts him or her at an edu-
cational disadvantage. Allowing the athlete the "right to work" while
denying that athlete the right to accept an advance on his or her future
professional earning potential only adds to an educational disadvantage.
Allowing athletes to accept money from an agent who wants to buy
representational rights also has some benefits. We know that many col-
lege athletes do not succeed in professional sports. Most never even get
drafted. If we allow all athletes to sell their representational rights, some
of those athletes who don't make it to the professional level will at least
get some financial reward for their time and effort. Since many of these
same athletes don't complete their degree program, perhaps this money
21. For a good discussion on the question of paying college athletes, see C. Peter
Goplerud, Stipends for College Athletes: A Philosophical Spin on a Controversial Proposal, 5
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 125 (1996).
22. NCAA Goes to Work For Student Athletes, THE SPORTS INDUSTRY DAILY, Jan. 14,
1997, No. 19.
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could be used to help them graduate after they have finished playing
their sport.23
In addition, payments might be critical for those players who are in
their junior year and who want to complete school but fear that an injury
during their senior year will prevent them from pursuing a professional
career. Currently, the NCAA allows a student to borrow money in or-
der to buy disability insurance.24 Why not allow the athlete to have that
insurance funded for him by an agent?
VII. SOLICITATION
The third area where the agent player relationship is the subject of
criticism for unethical behavior by an agent is solicitation. The problem
here is that licensed attorneys are generally prohibited from soliciting
clients.25 Agents who are not attorneys are not bound by such ethical
rules. However, because it is in the best interests of athletes to have the
most competent representation possible, it does not make sense that the
ethical rules give a competitive advantage to non-attorney agents, who
generally are not as well trained as lawyers to deliver the kinds of serv-
ices that are beneficial to athletes.26 Thus, it is better to eliminate the
state bar anti-solicitation rules.
An analysis of these no-solicitation rules must consider why they
were initially advocated. The United States Supreme Court has focused
its attention on the question of attorney advertising and solicitation, and
concluded that certain forms of advertising are protected commercial
speech,27 but that state bars can ban in-person solicitation.23 In Ohralik
23. Perhaps the NCAA could change its rules to allow such payments, so long as they are
placed in an educational trust fund.
24. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.1.2.1, reprinted in 1996-1997 NCAA MANUAL 99 (1996).
25. See, e.g., Rule 1-400 of California State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1-
400 is extremely broad and essentially prohibits all solicitation which is not protected by the
United States or California Constitutions. For an analysis and critique of this rule, see Diane
L. Karpman, Silence Isn't Golden, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 16, 1996, at 6.
26. The author is not suggesting, in any way, that non-attorney agents are, per se, incom-
petent. There exist a number of well respected, highly qualified agents who have never prac-
ticed law. However, attorneys are trained to do the basic tasks that agents routinely perform,
i.e., to advise, negotiate and draft contracts. Moreover, given the cost of law school, and the
value of a license to practice, attorneys also have more incentives to act in a legal and compe-
tent fashion than non-attorney agents. See Richard M. Nichols, Agent, Lawyer, Agent/Lawyer
... Who Can Best Represent Student Athletes?, 14 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1 (1996).
27. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Association, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Florida Bar v. went For It, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 2371 (1995).
28. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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v. Ohio State Bar Association, the Supreme Court noted that the ban on
solicitation "originated as a rule of professional etiquette rather than as
a strictly ethical rule." 9 In Ohralik, the American Bar Association de-
fended the no solicitation rule on three grounds: 1) to prevent over-
reaching and undue influence, 2) to protect an individual's privacy rights,
and 3) to avoid situations where a lawyer's judgment would be
"clouded" by financial self-interest.30 In sustaining the constitutionality
of an outright ban on in-person solicitation, the Supreme Court relied,
primarily, on the problem of overreaching, noting that the "potential for
overreaching is significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional
trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits and unsophisticated,
injured or distressed lay person."31
In the context of solicitation to secure an athlete's representational
rights, none of the reasons for a no solicitation rule are persuasive. Un-
like an accident victim, who is facing sudden and unexpected physical
and financial problems, an athlete's need for professional representation
is to maximize a financial potential that is the culmination of years of
planning and effort.
In this context, rather than focusing on the potential problems engen-
dered by the "unique features of in-person solicitation," we should con-
sider the unique benefits of in-person solicitation. For example, in
Edenfield v. Fane,32 the Supreme Court struck down a per se ban on
solicitation by certified public accountants, noting that:
Personal interchange enables a potential buyer to meet and eval-
uate the person offering the product or service, and allows both
parties to discuss and negotiate the desired form for the transac-
tion or professional relation. Solicitation also enables the seller
to direct his proposals toward those consumers whom he has rea-
son to believe would be most interested in what he has to sell.
For the buyer, it provides an opportunity to explore in detail the
way in which a particular product or service compares to its alter-
natives in the market.33
It is also important to distinguish the athlete's situation from that of
the more typical potential client because the athlete is going to be solic-
29. Id. at 460.
30. Id. at 461.
31. Id. at 465. The court also noted the privacy problem, but spoke in terms of a client
who was the "victim of misfortune." That, of course, is not the situation faced by a college or
professional athlete.
32. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
33. Id. at 766.
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ited by non-attorney agents. Thus, the rule merely protects the athlete
from one group of solicitors.
Similarly, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,34 the Supreme Court
noted that a "consumer's concern for the free flow of commercial speech
often may be far keener that his concern for urgent political dialogue. 35
The court further stated that "commercial speech serves to inform the
public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services, that
thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a
free society."36 Those comments certainly resonate in the context of
NCAA Division I football and basketball. Arguably, a Heisman Trophy
candidate is much more likely to care about the NFL draft than Presi-
dent Clinton's position on Bosnia. That candidate is also more likely to
want to compare the benefits of representation by Leigh Steinberg, a
licensed attorney, with representation by an agent who is not trained and
licensed to practice law.
In truth, Steinberg, as an established agent, is not going to be at a
competitive disadvantage. Prospective clients will seek him out. But,
young attorneys who want to break into the business are at a disadvan-
tage. If they do not already know an athlete, there is virtually no legiti-
mate way to break into the business as an attorney.37 Many work
around the rule by setting up a separate sports agency business. How-
ever, if the use of an alter ego is legitimate, than the no solicitation rule
is essentially useless. If the use of an alter ego is not legitimate, than we
are forcing a segment of the bar to break the rules and be labeled as
"unethical" without justification.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A charge that an individual is acting in an unethical manner is and
should be serious. If we want that charge to have meaning, it should not
be leveled against those who violate rules that have no justification.
Thus, it is appropriate to look at the rules as well as the violators. Do
the rules serve a useful function? Are they protecting a class of people
or institutions who need or who are worthy of protection? Do they re-
strict activity that is, in the absence of the rules, perfectly appropriate?
34. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
35. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364.
36. Id.
37. In Bates, the State Bar argued that allowing advertising would create a barrier by
allowing established firms a way of entrenching their positions. Id. at 377. The court rejected
that argument, noting that a ban on advertising actually perpetuates the market position of
established attorneys. Id. at 378.
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The problem of the unethical agent is a problem created by the rules -
not by those who break the rules.
